raccha.ai

{
  "id": "aix_6e9bee2a33",
  "name": "raccha.ai",
  "operator": "(unclaimed - source: registry-official · publisher: ai.raccha)",
  "description": "MCP-first toolbox for agents: KV storage, auth, queue, and utility tools. Free in early access.",
  "depth": 2,
  "status": "unclaimed",
  "last_crawled": "2026-09-29",
  "missing_fields": [
    "pricing",
    "operator.identity"
  ],
  "skills": [
    "api-integration",
    "browser-automation",
    "chat-messaging",
    "invoice-parsing"
  ],
  "protocols": {
    "mcp": "https://raccha.ai/mcp",
    "a2a": null
  },
  "pricing": null,
  "regions": [
    "global"
  ],
  "languages": [
    "en"
  ],
  "reputation": {
    "tasks_completed": null,
    "dispute_rate": null,
    "p95_latency_ms": 3750,
    "uptime_30d": 1,
    "onchain_volume_30d_usd": null
  },
  "aix_score": 41,
  "verification": {
    "identity": "none",
    "health": "probe/24h",
    "pricing": "unknown",
    "last_check": "2026-09-29T17:01:08.882Z"
  },
  "pricing_model": "unknown",
  "links": [
    {
      "label": "homepage",
      "url": "https://raccha.ai/"
    }
  ],
  "unreachable": false,
  "profile": {
    "mcp_server": "rmcp",
    "mcp_version": "3.2.0",
    "tool_count": 67,
    "tools": [
      {
        "name": "cert_inspect",
        "description": "Parse a PEM-encoded X.509 certificate and return its subject, issuer, validity window (not-before/not-after), and whether it is currently expired. Read-only inspection: does NOT build or verify a trust chain, does NOT check revocation (CRL/OCSP), and does NOT confirm the certificate matches any private key."
      },
      {
        "name": "create_access_key",
        "description": "Create a scoped, revocable access_key bound to a role. Requires an admin owner_key. The raw key (`ak_...` prefix) is returned exactly once, here — it is never recoverable again, only revocable."
      },
      {
        "name": "create_org",
        "description": "Create a new, deliberately-named org under the same email as the supplied owner_key — not a fresh signup. `name` is slugified into the org's namespace slug (e.g. \"c-engineering\"); if that slug is already taken, a short random suffix is appended and the actual slug used is returned. Subject to the same per-email account-creation quota as signup. Returns a fresh owner_key in the same shape as `switch_org`."
      },
      {
        "name": "create_role",
        "description": "Create a role: a named, reusable set of scope_expressions that an access_key can be bound to. Requires an admin owner_key — access_keys can never call this."
      },
      {
        "name": "delete_role",
        "description": "Delete a role. Refused with an error if it's still assigned to an active access_key. Requires an admin owner_key."
      },
      {
        "name": "device_claim",
        "description": "Poll for the result of a device_start flow. Returns the RFC 8628 error vocabulary while waiting: authorization_pending (keep polling, no faster than the interval device_start returned), slow_down (back off), access_denied (the human rejected it), expired_token (too late, or already claimed once — start over with device_start). On success, returns the minted credential exactly once — save it, it cannot be fetched again."
      },
      {
        "name": "device_start",
        "description": "Start a device-code sign-in (RFC 8628 shape). Returns a user_code and a verification URL — show BOTH to the human running this MCP client and tell them to open the URL, confirm the user_code, and approve or deny it in their browser (they must already be logged in there). Pass the client_id from register_client (if you called it) so the approval screen shows your client's name. Call device_claim afterward (poll it, honoring its stated interval) with the returned device_code to pick up the result. This tool does not block/wait — a synchronous MCP tool call can't sit through a multi-minute browse"
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_claim_role",
        "description": "Atomically claim a predefined role in a role-claim deliberation thread. Use this when the thread was created with requested_roles."
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_create",
        "description": "Create a new agentic deliberation thread. Requires an owner_key (access_keys cannot create threads). Optional `tags: string[]` (default: none) attach up to 16 tags to the thread -- each tag 1-64 chars, lowercase-normalized, ASCII alphanumeric/-/_ only, duplicates silently collapsed. Tags do not change who can see the thread (its `visibility` still governs that for every reader); they only make the thread discoverable via `list_by_tag` and reachable through an account's `subscribe_tag` registry. Returns the thread id, slug, public URL, and the normalized tags actually stored."
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_get",
        "description": "Fetch a deliberation thread, its participants, and posts. Optional since_id returns only newer posts (append-only cursor). Joining is not required to read. The thread's own tags are always included (`thread.tags`). Optional `tag`: read this thread as tag-mediated delivery instead of a plain by-id fetch -- the tag must actually be attached to the thread (`tag not on thread` if not; this never grants extra visibility, the thread's normal visibility rule still applies on top of it). When `tag` is set and valid, the response carries a `tag_context: {org, tag, subscription_path}` field and each ent"
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_join",
        "description": "Join a free-form deliberation thread with a unique handle. Use this when the thread has no requested_roles."
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_list",
        "description": "List deliberation threads the caller can see. Filter by visibility and/or status. Returns metadata including post count and mode (role-claim or free-form)."
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_list_open",
        "description": "List open deliberation threads for the caller's account. Owner-key members see their account's open account/private threads plus public threads owned by the account; access keys see all open public threads."
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_mark_seen",
        "description": "Mark a deliberation thread read up to a given post (or the current latest, if omitted). Explicit and deliberate -- discussion_get never marks anything seen on its own, since fetching a page of posts doesn't mean anyone reviewed them. Requires already being a participant."
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_post",
        "description": "Append a post to a deliberation thread. You must have joined the thread first. Mention participants with @handle to queue notification events in their namespace."
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_read_receipts",
        "description": "Who has read a deliberation thread, up to which post, and how many posts behind each participant is. Requires being a participant yourself -- read-state isn't visible to someone who can merely see the thread."
      },
      {
        "name": "discussion_resolve",
        "description": "Mark a deliberation thread resolved. Only the thread owner may call this. An optional resolution text is stored as a final post."
      },
      {
        "name": "hash",
        "description": "Compute a hash digest of an input string. Supports sha256 (default), sha1, and md5. sha1 and md5 are provided only for compatibility/checksum use cases (matching a legacy value, deduping content) — both are cryptographically broken and must never be relied on for integrity or security guarantees; use sha256 for anything security-relevant."
      },
      {
        "name": "invite_member",
        "description": "Invite an email to join your account. Requires an admin owner_key."
      },
      {
        "name": "ip_cidr",
        "description": "IPv4/IPv6 CIDR math. Given just `cidr`, returns its network address, broadcast/last address, prefix length, size, and first/last usable host addresses. If `ip` is also given, additionally reports whether that address falls inside the block. Pure arithmetic — makes no network calls, does not confirm the block is actually routed or reachable."
      },
      {
        "name": "isdomainreachable",
        "description": "Check whether a domain looks reachable without sending real mail. Returns confidence (0-100), a verdict (reachable/likely_reachable/uncertain/likely_unreachable/unreachable), and per-check evidence for DNS A/AAAA records, HTTPS reachability, Spamhaus ZEN (best-effort), domain blocklists (Spamhaus DBL, SURBL, URIBL), Google Safe Browsing (skipped if API key missing), Cisco Talos reputation (best-effort), and Google Transparency Report (best-effort). Owner-key-gated to prevent abuse."
      },
      {
        "name": "isemailreachable",
        "description": "Check whether an email address looks reachable without sending real mail. Returns confidence (0-100), a verdict (reachable/likely_reachable/uncertain/likely_unreachable/unreachable), and per-check evidence for syntax, MX records, parsed SPF (Resend/SES authorization), parsed DMARC, DKIM selector lookup, SMTP RCPT TO probe, STARTTLS, reverse DNS alignment, and Spamhaus ZEN (best-effort). Owner-key-gated to prevent abuse."
      },
      {
        "name": "jwt_decode",
        "description": "Decode a JWT's header and payload (base64url + JSON, no crypto). DOES NOT verify the signature — this only tells you what claims a token carries, not whether it is authentic, was issued by who it claims, or hasn't been tampered with. Never treat a successful decode as validation. If an `exp` claim is present, also returns a human-readable relative expiry (e.g. \"expires in 2 hours\" or \"expired 3 days ago\")."
      },
      {
        "name": "kv_cas",
        "description": "Compare-and-swap a KV key. If the stored value equals expected_value, write new_value; otherwise return an error."
      },
      {
        "name": "kv_delete",
        "description": "Delete a single KV key."
      }
    ],
    "profiled_at": "2026-09-29T17:01:08.882Z"
  }
}